CALEA II: Risks of Wiretap Modifications to Endpoints

Tags: 2010s CALEA II Wiretap

Authors: Adida, Ben and Anderson, Collin and Anton, Annie I. and Blaze, Matt and Dingledine, Roger and Felten, Edward W. and Green, Matthew D. and Halderman, J. Alex and Jefferson, David R. and Jennings, Cullen and Landau, Susan and Mitter, Navroop and Neumann, Peter G. and Rescorla, Eric and Schneider, Fred B. and Schneier, Bruce and Shacham, Hovav and Sherr, Micah and Wagner, David and Zimmermann, Philip

Published: May 2013

URL: https://cdt.org/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/CALEAII-techreport.pdf

Abstract: On May 17, 2013, the Center for Democracy & Technology published a report about the U.S. government’s proposal “to expand wiretap design laws broadly to Internet services, including voice over Internet protocol (VoIP) services and other peer-to-peer tools that allow communications in real-time directly between individuals.” The report discusses the fact that the U.S. government’s proposal “poses serious security risks”, and that “[r]equiring software vendors to build intercept functionality into their products is unwise and will be ineffective, with the result being serious consequences for the economic well-being and national security of the United States.” The article’s purpose is to convey the authors’ belief that the government’s proposal will be “much more costly to personal, economic and governmental security overall than the risks associated with not being able to wiretap all communications”.